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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COM~iISSION,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
11388

vs.
THOMAS V. WILLIAlVIS and
.JO ANN H. 'VILLIAJ\'IS, his wife,

Defendants and Appellants,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

PREFACE
Appellants seek a re-hearing and a reconsideration
of the opinion handed down in this matter by this Court
on April 4, 1969. It is submitted that the opinion contains several errors of law, that it adds to considerable
confusion which already exists in the field of eminent
domain law in the State of Utah, and that the rule
announced in the decision is unworkable in practice.

1

It is further submitted that the opinion places Utah
law in a very narrow minority of jurisdictions restricting recovery for severance damages, and, specifically,
the ruling places Utah practically alone among the
jurisdictions denying consideration to the element of
noise in its effect upon the value of real property both in "severance" and "consequential" damage situations.

Although the writer of this Petition is fully aware
that the Court rarely re-considers these matters, it is
still felt that he would be totally remiss in his duty in
not seeking a re-hearing since the Court's opinion did
not squarely decide the issue presented to it, it improperly ruled out consideration of noise in all eminent
domain cases-even though the plaintiff did not contend
that noise was never recoverable, and the legal and fac- •
tual difficulties created by the decision will further
haunt the orderly trial of eminent domain cases in the
future.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTINCTION BET\VEEN SEVERANCE AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
SET FORTH IN THE OPINION IS BOTH
LEGALLY INCORRECT AND CONFUSING.
Basic to any understanding and computation of
damages in a condemnation case is the proper categori2

zation of the two principal types of damages to properties not taken in a condemnation suit. As pointed
out in the opinion in this matter, Section 78-34-10,
U.C.A. 1953, contains two specific sub-sections covering
damages to remaining properties. It is submitted by
appellants-and was so contended in their Brief in this
matter-that the two sub-sections clearly delineate the
difference between "severance" and "consequential"
damages. Any different definition to these two types of
damages will inevitably create nothing but mounting
confusion in the field of eminent domain law.
The crux of the distinction in the Court's opinion
is contained in the following sentence:
"All damages not caused by the taking or the
severing of the land or the manner of the construction of the improvement are consequential
and not within the protection of the constitutional
provision unless they are such as would be actionable at common law or would affect the land
physically."

!

It is submitted that the foregoing definition of
"consequential" damages is incorrect and vague, unsupported by any decision or authority. This writer again
reiterates and contends that if the damages result from
situations involving an underlying taking of property,
then the resulting damages must be termed "severance";
otherwise, if there is not an underlying taking of property, then the resulting damages are "consequential".
This distinction is made mandatory by the two subsections of our statute. As Nichols points out (Sec.
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6.4432), broadly speaking, " ... all damages must o!.

necessity be consequential since all damage is the con-'
sequence of an injurious act." But that work goes on
to point out the difference between taking and no taking
cases. In 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 14-1 at
page 473 it is stated:

"A distinction must be drawn between consequestion damages to a remainder area where part
of a tract is physically appropriated and consequestial damages to a tract no part of which is:
physically appropriated. In the latter case the\
damage must be peculiar to such land and not I
such as is suffered in common with the general
public."
In defining the word "consequential" damages 2
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 6.4432 states the
meaning to be"The term is generally used with reference to
damage to property no part of which is appro·
priated."
In its opinion in this matter this Court has taken
the definition of "consequential" damages and super·
imposed it over into the area of "severance" damages.
Even if the ultimate decision of this Court was intended
to be that noise cannot be considered in any eminent
domain case, it is still clearly erroneous to create con·
fusion in the field of eminent domain law by classifying
noise as a "consequential" damage in a case where there
exists an underlying actual taking of property within
the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 78-34-10, U.C.A

4

I

1953. Rather, as this writer has contended before this

Court on two different occasions, in a taking case the
proper classification of "severance" damages should
remain, but the ruling should be that the particular type
of damage is simply non-cornpensable.
Believing that issues of this type can often be better
presented in a pictorial or diagram form, there is inserted on the flyleaf of this brief a sheet showing the
different types of "severance" and "consequential" damages and various Utah decisions supporting the compensable types of damages under each category. The
Utah decisions can generally be properly classified,
although some need to be "stretched" a bit to fit. A few
cases, not included in the outline are, in the writer's
opinion, clearly wrong. It can be seen that the writer
has clearly delineated "severance" from "consequential"
damages, and within each classification there are-as
this writer is contending in this Petition-definite compensable and non-compensable items. It is submitted
that the accompanying chart, which has been prepared
by this writer as a general condensation of many years
of careful study and devotion of the major portion. of
his practice to eminent domain matters, is the first
realistic attempt in this state to properly categorize
some of the pertinent cases and the type of damages
involved in different situations which have arisen.
If there has been a partial taking the entire proceeding as to damages to remaining properties is govverned by sub-section (2) of Section 78-34-10, as -
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"severance" damages. On the other hand, if there is no
underlying taking, then the proceedings and the type
of damages are recoverable under sub-section (3) ol
the same statutory section-" consequential" damages.
In short, the two types of dam.ages are mutually ea clu.
sive and can never be found together in any litigatio11
involving the same remaining piece of property I
1

To illustrate the distinction between "severance"
and "consequential" damages, we can utilize two previ·
ously decided cases of this court. In the case of Spring.
ville Banking Company v. Burton ( 1960), 10 U. 2d
100, 349 P. 2d 157, and the case of Fairclough vs. Salt
Lake County ( 1960), 10 U. 2d 417, 354 P. 2d 105, we
actually had two cases involving "consequential" dam·
ages for the simple reason that there was no basic under·
lying taking such as would bring the State Road Com·
mission into Court. However, if in both cases there had
in fact been an actual taking of a portion of the prop·
erty owner's lands, thereby classifying the damages
in both instances as "severance" damages, we would
have a situation producing different results. In the
Springville Banking case, since the nature of the dam·
ages was caused by the creation of traffic islands or
dividers in the street, such damage had there actually
been a taking, would have been non-compensable-and
that portion of the evidence would not go to the jury
at all. This would be so because the action taken was
a function of the police power in regulating the flow
of traffic.
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On the other hand, if we assume that there had been
an actual taking of a portion of the properties in the
F1airclough case, the matter would have been entirely
different since the taking and the construction of the
project was tied to a substantial change of highway
grade affecting the property's right of access. The
nature of the damage under such facts would also be
"severance" but the evidence of loss of value to the
remaining properties would be clearly admissible and
recoverable under our Utah cases and those of practically every other jurisdiction known to the writer, since
this type of damage is compensable.
Until our Utah decisions clearly and properly
delineate the distinctions between "severance" and "consequential" damages, and the correlative concepts of
"compensable" and "non-compensable" damages, the
confusion among our cases will grow greater and
greater. Until this decision and the recent case of State
of Utah by and through its Road Commission v. Stanger
(No. 11028), ____ Utah 2d ____ , 442 P. 2d 941, it was
possible to properly categorize the different Utah decisions as being "severance" or "consequential" situations.
Now, however, the concept of "consequential" damages
has by this decision been carried across the line into the
area of what have customarily been known as "severance" damages under sub-section ( 2) of Section 7834-10.

*

*

*

*

In its decision this Court made another statement
which has done nothing to clarify the law in this state:
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I

"
. the statute above set out gives a land. I
owner whose land is taken in part the damage~
which will accrue to the land not taken by reason
of its severance and by reason of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
In this case it is neither the damage occasionea
by the construction of the improvement nor the I
severance of the land which caused these defend·
ants to feel aggrieved, but rather it is the failure I
to recover the damages occasioned by the noise
of the traffic . . . "
Actually, Judge Norseth did in fact rule in his,
findings that the noise was "due to the widening of the
prevoiusly existing highway" and the " ... closer proximity ... " of the travelled portion the new highway
to the residence of the defendants; therefore, the pre·
viously quoted portion of the Court's opinion would
seem to imply that only "construction" damages result·
ing during the time when the highway was being built
would be recoverable. Such an approach would, ol
course, exclude damages resulting from the subsequent
"use" of the highway facility.

If damages incurred during "construction" only
can be considered, then we again find Utah in a very
narrow position among the various state court decisions. I
As a practical matter, most courts severely limit the
recovery for damages caused during the course of actual
constructoin since the bulk of such damages are not a
necessary and ordinary incident of the nature of thr
project. Such damages are usually the type which in·
volve negligence on the part of a contractor. In short.
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the area of recovery, under a construction which would
limit the recoveries to damages actually caused by and
during construction, is practically meaningless in its
effect toward furnishing a property owner with just
compensation.
The only logical and sensible approach to the provision of our statute allowing for recovery due to " ...
the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed ... " is to give the phrase a reasonable interpretation. Thus, the various courts have held that the "use"
' to be made of the property being acquired is a proper
element to be considered on the matter of "severance"
damages to the remaining properties. Referring to
Appellant's Brief filed in this matter the case of City of
Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 69 N.W. 2d 909,
dearly sets forth ( p. 14) the distinction between "severance" and "consequential" damage, and it also pointed
out that there should be considered both the "taking
and use" ... "to which the property taken will be devoted
by the taker." Further, in the case of Department of
Highways vs. Elizabethtown A1nuse1nents, Inc., 367
S.W. 2d 449 (Kentucky), the statement concerning
use was again mentioned:
"In any situation the use to which the condemned property will be put necessarily will have
some bearing on the existence and extent of damage to the remaining land of the condemnee. A
common example would be a reduction in value
of residential property resulting from the highway's being brought in close proximity to the
dwelling."
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From 26 American Jurisprudence 2d, Eminent
Domain, Sec. 160, page 830, the rule is further enunci.
ated:
''It is not necessary that damages shall be
caused by trespass or an actual physical invasion
of the real estate, but if the construction and
operation of the improvement are the cause of
the damage, although consequential, the party
may recover."
·
Contrary to the interpretation given the Oregon
Short Line Railroad case in this Court's opinion in this
matter, the same section from American Jurisprudence
states that-

"Any definite physical injury to land or an •
inVMion of it cognizable to the senses, depreciating its value, is a damage in the constitutional
sense, regardless of whether it is such an injury
as a neighboring owner might inflict without
liability at common law."

1

The rule stated by this Court's opinion requires
that any damage arising from the use of the acquired
property in a partial taking case must be actionable
at common law or affect the land physically. A similar
rule can be found in numerous cases and in the writings
of authorities on eminent domain; however, the rule
has never been applied to partial taking cases. The
requirement that the damage be actionable at common
law or directly affect the land physically applies only
to no-taking cases and has never been applied to partial·
taking cases. The error in applying this rule to partial
taking cases is pointed out in 2 Nichols on Eminent
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Domain, Sec. 6.441 (2) where the rule is discussed
in its application to no-taking cases and not in its application to partial taking cases. Nichols points out that
damages actionable at common law are those actionable
if done by an individual. Since an individual could not
effect a partial taking, the rule has no application to
partial taking cases. Any encroachment upon the land
analogous to a complete partial taking was and is obviously compensable. The rule's application came in the
no-taking cases where the injury originated or sprang
from neighboring property. The loss of lateral support
is an example of an injury actionable at common law.
This Court should not create an anachronism by applying this rule to cases where it has historically not been
applied and where it is totally unworkable.
Even in its application to no-taking cases, the rule's
reference to damages actionable at common law has
been criticized. In 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec.
6.441 ( 2) , the reference was said to " ... neither clarify
the situation nor give the clause a broad enough meanI ing ... " Also, in the same section the test to determine
whether an injury is actionable at common law was
said to be " . . . in 1nost cases
..."
C.J

Se./e S ~

A consideration of Subsection ( 4) of Section 78·H-10, concerning benefits, will point out the inconsis-

tency in this Court's position. That subsection provides
that benefits " . . . by the construction of the improvements proposed by the plaintiff . . . " can be set-off
against damages to the remaining tract. It will be noted
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that Subsection ( 4) refers to "construction" as do Subsections ( 2) and ( 3), and likewise contains no direct
reference to "use".
Nevertheless, this Court and all courts allowing
a set-off for benefits have allowed benefits arising from
the use of the proposed improvement. In fact, it is ditfi.
cult to conceive of a benefit which does not arise from
the u-se of the proposed improvement. That benefits
do arise from the use of the proposed improvement is
attested to by 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section
8.62, page 58:
"In those jurisdictions where set-off is per·
mitted, consideration may only be given to those
benefits which are to accrue from the projected
u-se on behalf of which the immediate condemna·
tion is instituted. Benefits .accruing from other
improvements cannot be considered." (Emphasis
added).
A listing of some benefits which have traditionally
been allowed as set-off will point out the truth to appel·
lant' s contention that most benefits do arise from the
intended use. In Section 8.6203 (3) of 3 Nichols on
Eminent Domain, the following benefits are listed:
"

(a) "

. newly acquired frontage

(b) "

. improved access . . . "

(c) "

. better accommodation of traffic .. ·

( d) "
ple ... "

passing of a greater number of peu·
12

.From a careful consideration of the listed benefits
it can be seen that a mere construction of an improve!llent will not give rise to the benefit. The benefit depends upon the proposed and anticipated use of the
improvement.
The rule adopted by this Court creates a double
standard-much to the advantage of the State Road
Conunission. The Court's rule allows benefits arising
from use but eliminates all damages arising from use.
Such a double standard is obviously not sanctioned by
the effect of each upon the market value of the remaining land.
" . . . The market value will reflect the possibility of harmful use as well as a beneficial
one, and will discount the possibility that the
public use may be discontinued altogether ... "
(Emphasis added) .
3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 8.6201,
page 64.
Likewise, this Court held that damages arising from
use of the proposed improvement be actionable at common law or affect the land physically. Again, this same
requirement of direct physical affect is not reflected in
the benefits allowed. A review of the listed traditional
benefits will point this out. Nichols in his work on Eminent Domain emphasizes that benefits need not have a
direct physical effect upon the remaining tract.

eJf-

"The market value ..38- a parcel of land may
be increased by a public improvement which effects no physical change in the land itself ... "
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Further analysis of the above quoted statement
from this Court's opinion, taken in view of the Oregon
Short Line Rail Road case, clearly shows that that case
actually considered elements of damage seemingly excluded by this opinion when it considered damages from
"jarring", or by the "throwing of cinders or ashes".
In short, such damages must of necessity arise from
the "use" to which the property would ultimately be put.

*

*

*

*

analysis of the opinion reveals another
fatal defect when taken in light of the quote from Board
of Education v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P. 2d
(1962). The portion of the quote which has significance
is the following:
}~urther

"Damages to land, by the construction of a
public or industrial improvement, through no
part thereof is taken as provided for under 78·
34-10 ( 3), contrary to the rule for severance
da mages ... ''
The statement referring to a different rule in "sev·
erance" damage situations seems to be the obstacle in
this entire matter which required the arbitrary definition of when and at what point damages become "con·
sequential", as set forth in the opinion. Further, it can
hardly be imagined that Justice 'Vade, when he wrote
the Croft opinion, ever had in mind the precise distinc·
tion between "severance" and "consequential" damages
that is set forth in this decision. In fact, specific reference

14

made to no-takin.q situations " ... as provided for
under 78-34-10 (3), contrary to the rule for severance
damages." The foregoing quote, taken from other
authority, quite clearly separates the two types of damages as this writer is suggesting, and the opinion of this
Court now sets up an arbitrary line distinguishing between "severance" and "consequential" damages, without basic supporting authority or reason.

is

The irony of the result in this case is that these
defendants throughout their Brief contended that the
case of Board of Education v. Croft was the prime
authority supporting their own position, and the plaint tiff in its Brief at page 11 merely ref erred to the quotation from the Croft case in this opinion as being "dicta"
and " ... not sufficient to overrule the precedent and
reasoning that has evolved since the enactment of the
Utah State Constitution." It thus appears that both
plaintiff and defendant felt that the quoted portion
of the Croft case, contrary to the result reached by the
Court in its opinion, was dispositive of the case in favor
of defendants!

POINT II
EXCESSIVE NOISE IS A PROPER ELEMENT OF DAMAGE TO BE CONSIDERED
IN A "TAKING" CASE UNDER SUBSECTION
12) OF SECTION 78-34-10.
15

Although the issue of the possible recovery ol
damages resulting from noise per se was not contested
by either party to this litigation this Court's opinion
is unusual in that it really decided the case on the basis
that noise was a non-compensable element in assessing
''severance" damages-as appellants would have it or, for that matter, even in "consequential" damage
situations. Thus, in no case in Utah can noise as such
be considered in an eminent domain proceeding. A
simple ruling, as indicated above, would have eliminated
the necessity of classifying noise as a "consequential"
damage in a taking case; however, the rule enunciated
in the Croft case forced the arbitrary line adopted by
this Court since it referred to a different rule in "sever·
ance" situations.
The irony of the decision is multiplied when it is
considered that, here again, neither the plaintiff nor
the defendant ever raised so much as a suggestion that
noise was not compensable in at least some situations.
An analysis of plaintiff's Brief and the argument made
before this Court will fail to find the slightest sugges·
tion that noise is never compensable. The only position
taken by plaintiff was that, in a '''severance" case involv·
ing an underlying taking, as well as in a "consequential"
case, the noise must be special, unique and peculiar to
the property affected in order to be considered. Nothing
in plaintiff's position implies or suggests that noise is
never a proper element supporting, among others, n
recovery in eminent domain cases.
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But the matter is not as simple as that of excluding
noise in all condemnation cases, as this Court has ruled.
Referring to the Oregon Short Line Rail Road case
cited by this Court in its opinion, we find that the reference to noise in that case was tied to-

"Mere noises, ... the effect (of which) would
be to or upon the sensibilities of such persons,
and not to or upon the property as such."
Even if we accept the Court's cited reference as
authority in Utah, the findings in this matter are not
such as to classify the noise to the Williams' properties
as being ''mere noises", which do not affect the value of
the property. The specific finding of the Court was that
the noises were so bad as to cause a diminution of
$3,896.00 in the market value of the property. As such,
the case cited by the Court in its opinion is not only a
case which would only be applicable in "consequential"
--0r non-taking cases (as was the fact )-but it is otherwise factually not in point with the Williams' situation.
Further, it is submitted that all individuals in the
use of their properties are entitled to reasonably quiet
and peaceable possessions of their premises. When the
noise factor becomes so great that it is impossible to
sleep during the summer months because of heavy and
noisy traffic, how can it be said that such noise is simply
"disagreeable" or an "annoyance" merely affecting the
"sensibilities of such persons". Certainly, noise to this
degree has a very definite adverse effect on the property, and, as a technical matter, is even a "physical"

17

trespass to the property itself in the form of loud anu
continuous sound waves.

A good number of airplane over-flight cases have I
been handed down in federal and state courts in recent I
years where noise has been the ingredient of damage. In
some of the cases the noise has actually been considered
to constitute an actual "taking" where the applicable
state constitutional provision (or the Fifth Amendment
to the U. S. Constitution) failed to include an "or
damaged" provision similar to that contained in our
Utah Constitution. The holdings in those non-taking
cases have been predicated on the basis that the noise
was such an invasion as to " ... deprive ( d) the property
owners of the enjoyment and use of their properties,''
and the noise may come straight down from above, or I
from some other direction. Even in those cases requiring I
a trespass due to an over-flight of the land damaged
(thereby effecting a technical legal taking) as in Batten
v. U.S., 306 F. 2d 580 (10th C.C.A.), the noise element
can be considered where an actual technical taking
occurs, although no constitutional "or damaging" provision is present.

I

J

To state that noise is never an element to be con·
sidered in either a "severance" or a "consequential" dam·
age case, as the Court's opinion makes quite clear, is to
disregard the facts of life and practically every legal
opinion on the subject in this nation. One need only go
to the matter of noise created by low flying planes avigation problems - to find massive authority that
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noise alone can be sufficient to permit recovery, particularly in cases involving takings. Similarly, the cases
• simply abound from all of the states providing that noise
and similar proximity elements can be considered in the
· overall assessment of damages in taking situations. A
i few of many decisions are cited in. Appellants' Brief:
I Tou.chberry-South Carolina (p. 12), Bourg and Leger
-Louisiana (p. 21), Elizabeth Amusements, Inc. Kentucky p. 21), Zaremba-Kentucky (p. 22), Burns
' -Kentucky (p. 22), Methodist Church-Georgia (p.
23), Pierpont Inn, Inc.-California (p. 23), and our
own Utah case of State Road Cornmission v. Christensen
(p. 22), 13 u. 2d 224, 371 p 2d 522 ( 1962) .
1

!

I

There is another serious problem which is over'I looked in the opinion-and that is the matter of segregating noise from other elements of damage. The
1 Williams' case contained a somewhat unusual situation
1
in that the amount of damage assignable to noise was
1 determinable because the appraiser of the property
owner used a "cost of cure" approach. Had this approach not been used, as will be the situation in prob. ~bly 90% of all cases where noise is an element mixed
Ill with other elements of damage, how could noise
/
ever properly be separated from an appraisal? The
I problems are great in this respect, and a condemnation
i matter involving such elements of damage might often
• binge on what appraiser and lawyer was best prepared
, as a technical matter. Just compensation should not
he made to hinge on such technicalities.
J

I
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I

On the general subject of attempting to segregate
and place value~ ~pon diff er~nt factors contribut~ng tu
damage to remammg properties, the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of New York ( 1967) in the case
of Dennison v. State, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 257, pointed out
that a consideration of noise as a factor contributing
to damages was not separable from other concededly
legitimate factors, and therefore, was not subject to
a valuation by the Appellate Court. It also pointed out
that the inter-relation of noise with elements such as
vision and privacy would have made it impossible to
attribute specific amount to noise. However, the issue
was resolved since the court held noise was properly
considered a factor of damage caused by the construetion of a new highway.
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CONCLUSION

With all due respect to the opinion handed down I s
by this Court it can be said that the opinion seemingly / t
reads well, but a close analysis of the opinion reveals
serious defects of factual application and legal inter· I
pretation which can be summarized as follows:
I
I. The Court created an erroneous

distinction
between "severance" and "consequential" damages, anrl
the quoted portion from the Croft case supports the rule i
and theory advanced by appellants in this case rather
than that of the opposite position.
11

2. The apparent ruling of this Court to the effect
that damages resulting from the intended "use" of :i

20

,

, . project cannot be considered in the severance damage
J i analysis is both unsound law and is contrary to the
1
elements of damage which were actually considered in
e the Oregon Short Line Railroad case cited in the
t opinion.
matter the type of noise in the
~ I OregonAsShorta factual
Line Rail Road case was not the degree
3.

() !
11

noise sustained by the 'Villiams' properties as was
reflected in a substantial diminution in the market value
of the properties.

I of

I
I

,; I

4. Noise has uniformly been recognized as an ele-

ment affecting value of remaining properties in "sever-

:· ! ance or taking cases where it was of sufficient degree

-· 1

to affect market value.

*

*

*

*

The opinion handed down in this matter should be
n / substantially modified and the judgment resulting
ly I therefrom should be reversed in favor of appellants.
ls
r-1
Respectfully submitted,
I

GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney for Appellants
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